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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In the United States, corporate directors are authorized to set their own 
compensation.1 Inherent in this authority is the incentive for directors to award 
themselves substantial bonuses.2 When directors set their own compensation, they are 
self-interested because they stand on both sides of the transaction.3 In general, director 
decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, which presumes that “directors 
act on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are 
in the corporation’s best interest.”4 However, when director decisions involve self-
dealing or self-interest, directors need shareholder ratification; otherwise, they have 
the burden to show that the transaction is entirely fair to the corporation.5 Therefore, 
to ensure that director’s decisions about their own compensation are provided the 
protection of the business judgment rule, corporations prefer to implement generic 
compensation plans that are submitted to shareholders for approval. Shareholder-
ratified compensation plans generally set lax limitations and authorize directors to 
have broad discretion in deciding the compensation each director will earn each year.6
 In the past few decades, having recognized that the incentive for directors to 
award themselves more than what they are entitled to is not eliminated by having a 
ratified compensation plan in place, Delaware courts7 have limited the application of 
the business judgment rule even in cases involving shareholder-approved director 
1. This authority is derived from the Model Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted, at least in 
part, by most U.S. jurisdictions. See Model Bus. Corp. Act, at xix, § 8.11 (2005) (“Unless the articles 
of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors may fix the compensation of 
directors.”).
2. Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
3. See Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 745–46 (Del. Ch. 2007).
4. Black’s Law Dictionary 226–27 (9th ed. 2009).
5. See Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware 
Courts’ Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 589, 607 (2008); Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. 
Winmill, No. 3730-VCN, 2011 WL 2176478, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
6. See, e.g., Republic Servs., Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (Form 14A) (Apr. 6, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1060391/000095014407003261/g06437def14a.htm#129 (authorizing directors to grant a total of 10.5 
million shares in equity compensation, 2.5 million of which were subject to grants of options or stock 
appreciation rights, to any “eligible individual” during any fiscal year, and 1.25 million of which were 
subject to grants of performance shares, restricted stock, and awards of common stock to any “eligible 
individual” during any fiscal year).
7. Delaware courts are perceived as leaders in the development of corporate law and that is why Delaware 
law is the focus of this note. See, e.g., In re Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d 41, 47 (Tex. App. 2011) (describing 
Delaware as “the Mother Court of corporate law”); Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2003) 
(also describing Delaware as “the Mother Court of corporate law”); Wooley v. Lucksinger, 14 So. 3d 
311, 474 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (acknowledging “Delaware’s leadership in the field of corporate law”). The 
term “stockholder” adopted by Delaware courts will be used in this article interchangeably with the 
term “shareholder” adopted by some other jurisdictions.
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compensation plans.8 Ultimately, in June 2012, the Delaware Chancery Court 
decided Seinfeld v. Slager and adopted a higher standard for reviewing director 
compensation awards.9
 Under this new standard, corporate directors have the burden to prove that the 
compensation they awarded to themselves is entirely fair to the corporation. Thus, these 
directors no longer enjoy the automatic blessing of the business judgment rule simply 
because shareholders ratified the company’s compensation plan. Because the Slager 
standard has not been fully developed yet, it leaves Delaware corporations and their 
directors unclear about what safeguards would guarantee the protection of the business 
judgment rule. Furthermore, it leaves aggrieved shareholders bereft of guidance on 
which elements to plead in their complaints alleging excessive director compensation to 
satisfy this new standard, and thus survive directors’ motions to dismiss.
 This note discusses Slager’s heightened standard and attempts to clarify the 
ambiguities it presents to both corporate directors and shareholders. Part II presents 
the relevant background, and describes the evolution of director compensation 
practices. Part III discusses how the business judgment rule applies to director 
decisions in the context of self-dealing transactions, and how shareholder ratification 
can provide a “safe harbor” for conflicted directors. Part IV provides an overview of 
Slager ’s new standard and suggests ways that corporate directors can ensure 
compliance with its requirements. Part V concludes this note.
ii. hOW arE dirECtOrs COMpEnsatEd?
 A. A Brief History of Director Compensation
 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, corporate board members 
were not entitled to compensation for their services.10 In Cahall v. Lofland, a leading 
Delaware decision of its time, the court held that “[d]irectors [were] presumed to serve 
without compensation[.]”11 In Lofland, neither the charter nor the bylaws of the 
company authorized paying a salary or any other type of compensation to directors for 
their services.12 The incentive to act in the best interests of the corporation stemmed 
from the directors’ ownership of a substantial amount of the company’s capital stock, 
8. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying 
protection of the business judgment rule in cases of “spring-loading” and “bullet-dodging”); Weiss v. 
Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 663 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(internal quotations omitted) (stating that stockholder ratification is not a “blank check” theory and does 
not automatically guarantee the protection of the business judgment rule).
9. No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
10. See, e.g., Nat’l Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1899) (“Directors of 
corporations . . . serve without wages or salary. They are generally financially interested in the success 
of the corporation they represent, and their service as directors secures its reward in the benefit which it 
confers upon the stock which they own.”); Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 141 A. 54, 63 (Del. Ch. 
1928) (requiring directors to surrender the profits they made as commissions back to the corporation).
11. 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921).
12. Id. at 230.
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which would produce dividends if the corporation performed well.13 Plaintiffs argued 
that certain cash payments and stock issuances were made to the company’s board 
members without consideration, and that these were received as compensation for 
extra services rendered to the company.14 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded 
that directors could be compensated for services rendered within the scope of their 
duties as directors only if the company’s stockholders, charter, or bylaws explicitly 
authorized such compensation.15 Services outside their duties as directors could only 
be compensated where “an express contract to pay for such services” existed and if the 
contract was “made with directors, or other proper corporate officers who have no 
personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the contract[.]”16
 The requirement to compensate independent directors eroded as the phenomenal 
growth of the American economy transformed corporate economics.17 Corporations 
were no longer local ventures owned by entrepreneurs, but were instead national in 
size and scope.18 They were no longer owned by a few, but rather by thousands of 
investors across the nation.19 Former board members from the shareholder ranks 
were replaced by new members who were professional managers and typically owned 
only a very small portion of the company’s shares.20 These new outside directors 
owned little to no equity in the company and thus had no personal financial stake in 
rendering board service.21 The need for director compensation arose because the only 
way to attract potential candidates—who did not have any equitable stake in the 
corporation’s success, but were expected to expend time and effort in their roles as 
directors—was to incentivize them through compensation.22
 In 1953, in response to this trend in director appointments, the Committee on 
Business Corporations of the American Bar Association revised the Model Business 
Corporation Act (the “Model Act”) to authorize boards of directors to set their own 
compensation.23 Importantly, the committee added the following sentence at the end 
of the Model Act, section 33: “The board of directors shall have the authority to fix 
13. Lofland v. Cahall, 118 A. 1, 2 (Del. 1922).
14. Id. 
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom 




21. Id. at 141.
22. Id.
23. The Model Act was created in 1950 to unify states’ definitions of corporations. The initial 1950 version 
of the Act provided: “The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors. 
Directors need not be residents of this State or stockholders of the corporation unless the articles of 
incorporation or by-laws so require. The articles of incorporation or by-laws may prescribe other 
qualifications for directors.” Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1950).
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the compensation of directors unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
incorporation.”24 This language was adopted by most jurisdictions in their own 
versions of the statute25 and remains practically intact in the current, slightly revised 
provision of the Model Act.26 Like numerous jurisdictions, Delaware adopted its 
first version of the Model Act, section 33 in 1953.27
 B. Current Trends in Director Compensation
 By 1960, director compensation became generally accepted.28 Presently, board 
members are compensated for their services to the corporation in various ways.29 The 
traditional form of director compensation is a cash payment, such as an annual 
retainer or meeting fees.30 Many corporations also compensate their directors on a 
deferred basis.31 Outside directors, who are not otherwise employed by the 
corporation, may receive current or deferred compensation, or both.32 To attract and 
24. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 33 (1953) (emphasis added).
25. Today, all but eight states have enacted statutes authorizing board members to set their own 
compensation. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 10A-2-8.11 (2013); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-811 (2013); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 4-27-811 (West 2013); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-108-111 (West 2013); D.C. Code § 
29-306.11 (2013); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.08101 (West 2013); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-811 (West 
2013); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-201 (West 2013); Idaho Code § 30-1-811 (West 2013); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 23-1-33-10 (West 2013); Iowa Code Ann. § 490.811 (West 2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 
17-6301(h) (West 2013); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12:81(c) (2013); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
450.1505(3) (West 2013); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.211 (2013); Miss. Code Ann. Stat. § 79-4-8.11 
(West 2013); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.310 (West 2013); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-427 (West 2013); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-2088 (West 2012); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:8.11 (2013).
26. See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.11 (1991) (stating in relevant part that “[u]nless the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors may fix the compensation of 
directors”).
27. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(h) (West 2013). 
28. In Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery held that board members 
who were also salary recipients could establish entitlement to compensation for their services to the 
corporation, although unauthorized by a proper board and not validly ratif ied by independent 
stockholders. 146 A.2d 602, 612 (Del. Ch. 1958).
In 1962, a substantial majority of the largest American public corporations compensated 
their outside directors. Among manufacturing companies, the median board meeting 
fee was $200, and the median annual retainer was $2000. By 1975, virtually all public 
companies compensated their directors and, among manufacturing companies, the 
median annual compensation, including fees and retainers, had grown to $6000, with 
the largest companies paying a median of $13,000.
 Elson, supra note 17, at 147.
29. See 2 Michael B. Snyder, Compensation and Benefits § 9:24 (2013) [hereinafter Snyder, 
Compensation and Benefits].
30. See Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 258–59 (5th ed. 2011).
31. Michael B. Snyder, Benefits Guide § 9:10 (2002) [hereinafter Snyder, Benefits Guide].
32. Id.
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retain outside directors, many corporations allow them to participate in the company’s 
deferred compensation plans,33 which include retirement plans34 and stock plans.35
 Stock plans typically provide outside directors with grants of stock itself, options 
to purchase stock, or stock appreciation rights.36 Granting stock outright is the 
simplest form of equity compensation because directors immediately become 
stockholders.37 Granting an option to purchase stock allows directors to buy a specified 
number of shares at a price equal to the share price on the date the option is granted, 
known as the “exercise price” or “strike price.”38 Stock options are usually subject to a 
vesting schedule, which encourages a director to make a long-term commitment to 
stockholder interests by requiring continued board service before vesting.39 Finally, 
stock appreciation rights, also referred to as “phantom stock” awards, provide directors 
with cash or stock payments based on the increase in the value of a stated number of 
shares over a specific period of time.40
 In the past, courts have relied on the business judgment rule to protect directors’ 
ability to pay themselves salaries and assign themselves stock awards upon shareholder 
approval.41 Partly due to this safeguard provided by the courts, non-employee director 
compensation is rising significantly across all corporate revenue sectors.42 The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act43 slowed, but did not stop, the 
33. Id.
34. See generally Terri R. Day, Pension Funds in Bankruptcy: The Spendthrift Trust “Safe Harbor”, 43 Fla. L. 
Rev. 67, 91 (1991). Retirement plans cover employees’ retirement or death benefits and are beyond the 
scope of this note, which will focus exclusively on stock compensation plans.
35. Snyder, Benefits Guide, supra note 31.
36. Andrew Stumpff, Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation 318 (2011).
37. Snyder, Compensation and Benefits, supra note 29.
38. Stumpff, supra note 36, at 319.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., In re CNET Networks, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing a complaint 
arising out of multimillion dollar awards of backdated stock options to the company’s board members); 
Seidman v. Clifton Savs. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 155 (2011) (dismissing a complaint arising out of 
the payment of millions of dollars in salary, stock option grants, and restricted stock awards to seven 
board members). See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
42. According to data compiled by Bloomberg.com, board members’ pay grew by a total of 15% between 
2007 and 2012, the pay for directors at Standard & Poor’s 500 Index companies rose to a record average 
of $251,000 and this is typically for only around 250–300 work hours a year. Jeff Green & Hideki 
Suzuki, Board Director Pay Hits Record $251,000 for 250 Hours, Bloomberg (May 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/board-director-pay-hits-record-251-000-for-250-hours.
html; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Corporate Dirs., The 2011–2012 NACD Director Compensation 
Report (2011–12), available at http://www.nacdonline.org/Resources/BoardVisionEpisode.
cfm?ItemNumber=4778.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
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growth of directors’ compensation.44 In 2012, the total median compensation paid to a 
director of a corporation with a market capitalization below $1 billion was $118,000, of 
a corporation with a market capitalization between $1 and $5 billion—$178,000, and of 
a corporation with a market capitalization above $5 billion—$229,000.45
 Because Slager limited the protection of the business judgment rule previously 
afforded to directors deciding their own compensation, it makes challenging these 
decisions easier and potentially exposes directors to the risk of additional derivative 
lawsuits.46 This is especially true considering the continuous rise in directors’ 
compensation. Thus, now more than ever, corporate directors need guidance about 
how to ensure the protection of the business judgment rule and about what defenses 
pled in their answers will make the dismissal of disapproving shareholders’ complaints 
more likely.
iii. thE LiMitLEss prOtECtiOn Of thE prE-sLagEr bUsinEss JUdgMEnt rULE
 The historical protection of the business judgment rule allows directors to 
manage a corporation without fear of having their decisions second-guessed by 
stockholders who have the benefit of hindsight.47 The business judgment rule creates 
a rebuttable presumption that corporate directors make their business decisions with 
the company’s best interests in mind.48 When the requirements of the business 
judgment rule are satisfied, a director will not be liable for the consequences of his or 
her actions.49 As a result, the business judgment rule gives directors the opportunity 
to take calculated risks without the threat of a lawsuit.50 Procedurally, when board 
members exercise their business judgment, the plaintiffs challenging the transaction 
have the burden to rebut the presumption by disproving that the directors acted in 
the best interests of the corporation.51 If the business judgment rule is not rebutted, a 
44. Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc., 2012 Director Compensation Report: Non-Employee Director 




46. See generally Advisen Ltd., D&O Claims Trends: Q1 2013, at 2 (April 2013), available at http://
corner.advisen.com/pdf_files/QuarterlyD&O_ClaimsTrends_2013Q1.pdf (referring to a “surge” in 
say-on-pay claims filed by plaintiff ’s class action firms).
47. Scarlett, supra note 5, at 600.
48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
49. Melvin Aron Eisenberg & James D. Cox, Corporations and Other Business Organizations 
Cases and Materials 282–83 (10th ed. 2011); Dennis J. Block, Stephen A. Radin & Nancy E. 
Barton, The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 5–6 (6th ed. 
2009).
50. See Eisenberg & Cox, supra note 49, at 282–83; Block et al., supra note 49, at 5–6.
51. Block et al., supra note 49, at 5.
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“court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board” because directors, and 
not the courts, are better suited to make business decisions.52
 Furthermore, a showing of fraud, illegality, waste, or breach of fiduciary duties 
can rebut the presumption of business judgment.53 Once a plaintiff rebuts the 
presumption by showing either that the directors violated a fiduciary duty or that the 
business judgment rule does not apply because defendants committed an act of fraud, 
illegality, or waste, the burden shifts back to the director-defendants to prove the 
“entire fairness” of the transaction.54
 A. The Business Judgment Rule and Self-Dealing Transactions
 There is an exception to the general application of the business judgment rule: it 
does not apply to self-dealing transactions. The duty of loyalty, which Delaware 
courts define as “the duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best interest,”55 
dictates that the protection of the business judgment rule “can only be claimed by 
disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business 
judgment.”56 It requires directors to act “in the best interests of the company” and its 
stockholders instead of in their personal interests.57
 A self-dealing transaction exists when an interested director stands on both sides 
of a transaction.58 “A well settled precept of Delaware corporate law is that a fiduciary 
is considered interested where he or she will receive a personal financial benefit from 
the transaction that is not equally shared by the stockholders.”59 Director decisions 
regarding their own compensation necessarily involve self-dealing because a director 
who receives the benefit of corporate assets, stands on both sides of the transaction.60 
Therefore, unlike corporate executive compensation, which generally falls within the 
board’s business judgment, director compensation—a self-dealing transaction—does 
52. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
53. Scarlett, supra note 5, at 601–02.
54. Id. at 602.
55. In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citations 
omitted).
56. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The court further stated that the business judgment 
rule prevents directors from being on both sides of the transaction or expecting any “financial benefit 
from it in the sense of self dealing[.]” Id.
57. Id. 
58. In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 174–76, 175 n.36 (Del. Ch. 2005).
59. Id. at 175.
60. See generally David A. Drexler, Lewis S. Black Jr. & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Delaware 
Corporation Law and Practice § 15.09 (2012); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. 
Ch. 1974). 
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not. As a result, the board members would bear the burden of proving that the salary 
and bonuses they pay themselves are entirely fair to the company.61
 The entire fairness standard requires a court to analyze a challenged transaction 
for fair dealing.62 This standard of review is most favorable to plaintiffs and requires 
defendants to prove, subject to strict judicial scrutiny, that the challenged transaction 
was objectively fair.63 When courts require directors to pass the entire fairness test, 
directors must show a reasonable purpose for their actions.64 Generally, a legitimate 
business purpose—for instance, employee retention or reducing transaction costs—
would meet the fairness requirement and would pass the entire fairness test even 
when the challenged transaction negatively affects stockholders.65 The entire fairness 
test does not, however, require directors to show that their action is the result of their 
best effort to fulfill the interests of the challenging minority; rather, it requires them 
to prove that their action is plausible or reasonable.66
 Nevertheless, there are ways directors can avoid having to meet the entire fairness 
standard in the context of self-dealing transactions. Specifically, there are two ways 
to eliminate the conflict and establish business judgment rule protection for board 
members who made decisions about their own compensation: (1) using an independent 
compensation committee to design a compensation plan and (2) submitting the plan 
to stockholders for ratification.67
61. See Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Winmill, No. 3730-VCN, 2011 WL 2176478, at *1, *4 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011) (“[W]here the individuals comprising the board and the company’s management are the same, the 
board bears the burden of proving that the salary and bonuses they pay themselves as officers are entirely 
fair.”); see also Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 431 (Del. 1997) (stating that the entire fairness 
monitor “ensure[s] that individuals who purport to act as fiduciaries in the face of conflicting loyalties 
exercise their authority in light of what is best for all entities”); Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. 12784, 
1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *16–18 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1993) (denying director-defendants’ motion to 
dismiss because the business judgment rule would be unavailable if alleged self-enrichment of defendants 
was proven); Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding that because the 
defendant fixed his own salary, he was required to prove that the salary was entirely fair—a burden that 
the defendant was unable to meet); Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189, 204 n.6 (1996). In transactions where 
directors approve their own compensation, as in any other conflict of interest transaction, directors bear 
“the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the corporation[.]” Id.
62. Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in Conflict Transactions on Motions to 
Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 967, 974 (2011).
63. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
64. Nicola de Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders’ Welfare Growth “Fairness” v. “Precise Equality”, 34 
Del. J. Corp. L. 853, 858 (2009).
65. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (finding that creating an “employees only” 
stock option plan for the purpose of employee retention met the fairness requirement and passed the 
entire fairness test); Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 805 A.2d 209 (Del. Ch. 2002) (justifying a reverse stock 
split in order to reduce costs).
66. See Lazarus & McCartney, supra note 62, at 974.
67. Ravenswood Inv. Co. v. Winmill, No. 3730-VCN, 2011 WL 2176478, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
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 B. The Effect of Stockholder Ratification on Self-Dealing Transactions
 Ratification derives from the law of agency, which establishes the legal authority 
of an agent in circumstances where the agent is not given express authority by the 
principal.68 Ratification is effective only if the agent completely discloses all relevant 
information related to the transaction to the principal.69 Because the relationship 
between the agent and the principal is fiduciary in nature, the agent seeking 
ratification must act with candor and loyalty.70 Thus, if the principal’s consent is 
obtained through coercion, the ratification will be invalid.71
 Assuming ratification sought by an agent is validly obtained, what effect does it 
have under corporate law if board members are the agents and stockholders are the 
principals? The Delaware Supreme Court has suggested that in instances other than 
those when a stockholder vote is a necessary step in authorizing a transaction,72 there 
are four possible effects of stockholder approval of a transaction.73 First, ratification 
can be treated as a complete defense to any charge of a breach of a fiduciary duty.74 
Second, ratification can change the standard of judicial review from the entire 
fairness to the waste standard of review.75 Third, ratification can shift the burden of 
persuasion back to the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of a self-dealing transaction.76 
Finally, ratification can be treated as undeserving of judicial recognition because of 
stockholder apathy, discrepancies in the definition of a “disinterested” stockholder, 
or because a disinterested stockholder decision to approve a transaction was influenced 
by interested directors, managers, or stockholders.77
68. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958).
69. Id. § 91.
70. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 334 (Del. Ch. 1997). For a more detailed discussion of the “duty of 
candor” see infra Part III.B.2.
71. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 334; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 100.
72. The doctrine of ratification “must be limited to its so-called ‘classic’ form; that is, to circumstances 
where a fully informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not legally require shareholder 
approval in order to become legally effective.” Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009). 
Therefore, the doctrine of ratification would apply in circumstances of approval of a compensation plan, 
but will be inapplicable, for instance, to an amendment of a certificate of incorporation, approval of a 
merger, or dissolution of an enterprise.
73. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 334.
74. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995) (holding that 
ratification eliminates any claim for breach of duty of care); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 663 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (noting that uncoerced, fully informed, and disinterested stockholder approval of a corporate 
action, in most situations, precludes claims for breach of fiduciary duty challenging that action).
75. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979) (noting that effective ratification of a 
director-interested transaction triggers application of the waste standard).
76. See, e.g., Citron v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 (Del. Ch. 1990) (noting that 
effective ratification shifts the burden of persuasion to plaintiff).
77. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 334; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder 
Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 Hastings L.J. 642 (2003) (recognizing that 
the number of disinterested stockholders who approve the transaction can be miscalculated as a result of 
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 Most frequently, courts hold that disinterested stockholder approval reinstates 
the business judgment rule and precludes judicial scrutiny of the transaction.78 In 
Delaware, this outcome derives from the Delaware Corporate Code, section 144(a)
(2), which states that no transaction involving a conflicted director will be invalidated 
if “[t]he material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship or interest and as to 
the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to 
vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by 
vote of the stockholders[.]”79 Therefore, Delaware courts have traditionally treated 
fully informed stockholder ratification as validation of a self-dealing transaction and 
have removed these transactions from the purview of the entire fairness review.80
 Notwithstanding stockholder ratification, a plaintiff can challenge director 
compensation in three ways: by establishing (1) that ratification was obtained through 
coercion,81 (2) that the challenged transaction constituted waste of corporate assets, 
or (3) that ratification was based on incomplete disclosure.82 Until Slager, in cases 
where stockholders had approved compensation plans authorizing director 
compensation, these were the only avenues available to stockholder-plaintiffs seeking 
to challenge excessive compensation awarded by directors to themselves.83
  1.  Challenging Director Compensation Post-Ratification on the Grounds of Waste
 Even though stockholder ratification might protect the board against suits 
claiming it violated its fiduciary duty of loyalty or care, it does not protect the board 
the following factors: (1) Delaware courts have not defined the term “disinterested” stockholder and as 
a result, management has considerable discretion in determining which votes count, (2) management 
has no express obligation to implement a system designed to ensure that interested shares are not 
counted in the final total, and (3) stockholder identity can be obscured through nominee accounts and 
other forms of beneficial ownership).
78. See, e.g., Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336; In re Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d at 1203; see also In re 3COM Corp. 
S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (holding that prior 
stockholder approval of a stock option plan reinstates the business judgment rule); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 367–69 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds and 
remanded, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
79. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2013).
80. In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d at 368.
81. An otherwise valid stockholder vote may be nullified by a showing that the structure or circumstances of the 
vote were impermissibly coercive. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382 (Del. 1996); see also In re Gen. 
Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 620 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Impermissible coercion exists where 
the ‘board . . . takes actions which [influence] the stockholders to vote in favor of the proposed transaction for 
some reason other than the merits of the transaction.’”) (quoting Williams, 671 A.2d at 1382–83). Even 
though coercion is a valid ground for invalidating shareholders’ approval of a transaction, it is rarely used in 
cases challenging executive or director compensation, and is therefore not addressed in this note.
82. See, e.g., Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 652 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the complaint based on allegations that stockholder ratification was procured through materially 
misleading disclosures).
83. See, e.g., Lewis, 699 A.2d at 339 (holding that stockholders had a sufficient claim for waste despite 
proper stockholder ratification of the company’s stock option and compensation plan).
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against claims of waste of corporate assets.84 Acts of corporate waste cannot be 
corrected by a non-unanimous majority vote because such acts are void, i.e. “ultra 
vires, fraudulent gifts or waste of corporate assets,” rather than voidable, i.e. acts that 
could be “performed in the interest of the corporation but beyond the authority of 
management.”85 While voidable acts can usually be cured by non-unanimous majority 
stockholder ratification, void acts cannot.86 A void act “serves as an exception to the 
defense of shareholder ratification and can be cured only by a unanimous shareholder 
vote.”87 Therefore, even if the compensation plan was ratified by the stockholders, a 
stockholder may still bring a derivative action and survive a motion to dismiss if 
waste is properly alleged.88
 The standard for claiming waste is high and “very rarely satisfied by a shareholder-
plaintiff.”89 To state a claim for waste, a plaintiff must show that the challenged 
transaction is “so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”90 Most often, the 
claim is associated with “a transfer of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose” 
or “for which no consideration at all is received.”91 However, if the directors acted in 
good faith in approving the transaction and there was any substantial consideration 
received by the corporation, there will be no finding of waste, even if “the fact finder 
would conclude ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.”92 Under this 
standard, the court is not expected to examine “the allegations to see whether 
consideration, once received, was excessive or lopsided, was proportional or not, or 
even whether it was a ‘bad deal’ from a business standpoint.” 93 In other words, the 
court is not expected to exercise business judgment because that authority is reserved 
for the boards.94
84. Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the 
Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. Corp. L. 145, 154 (2000).
85. Id.; Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 218-19 (Del. 1979).
86. Michelson, 407 A.2d at 218–19 (“The essential distinction between voidable and void acts is that the 
former are those which may be found to have been performed in the interest of the corporation but 
beyond the authority of management, as distinguished from acts which are [u]ltra vires, fraudulent or 
gifts or waste of corporate assets.”).
87. Mary A. Jacobson, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of Shareholder Ratification, 
21 Del. J. Corp. L. 981, 992 (1996).
88. See Johnson, supra note 84, at 153–55.
89. In re 3COM Corp. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999).
90. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
91. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
92. Id.; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (justifying hiring a 
president who was subsequently terminated less than a year later at a cost of $130 million in severance 
payout).
93. In re 3COM Corp., 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id.
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 Courts generally give great deference to board decisions concerning director and 
executive compensation because the board is in the best position to determine if a 
particular individual warrants large sums of money, and whether the compensation 
should be paid in the form of a salary, a retainer, or on a deferred basis.95 Deference 
is given to encourage boards to undertake the optimal and rational level of risk.96 
Moreover, courts are “ill-fitted to attempt to weigh the ‘adequacy’ of consideration . . . 
or . . . to judge appropriate degrees of business risk.”97
 Courts cannot declare director or executive compensation excessive without 
immediately inviting the question: “How much is too much?”98 This question can be 
answered only through factual investigations which cover, inter alia, the “acumen of 
the [employee], the competitive environment in the industry, and the recruitment 
and retention challenges faced by the corporation.”99 Therefore, the question of “how 
much is too much?” is “far better suited for the boardroom than the courtroom” 
because board members have a better grasp of these relevant facts.100
 Based on these principles, stockholder complaints alleging that director 
compensation constituted waste are commonly dismissed.101 For a stockholder-
plaintiff to succeed on a claim of waste in the context of director or executive 
compensation, the directors’ actions must be extreme. For instance, in In re Citigroup 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court stated that the 
departure package for the former CEO—which included $68 million in salary, 
bonus, and accumulated stockholdings, plus an administrative assistant, and a car 
with a driver for up to five years—could create, if proven, a reasonable doubt that the 
agreement was “so one-sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment 
could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”102
 In another example, Sample v. Morgan, a shareholder brought a derivative class 
action after corporate directors issued shares to allegedly “attract and retain” key 
employees.103 The Delaware Chancery Court declined to dismiss plaintiff ’s claim for 
waste because the inside directors authorized issuing 200,000 shares to themselves for 
only $200, or one cent per share, all the while knowing that the shares had a per-share 
95. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
96. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336.
97. Id.
98. In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 983 (Del. Ch. 2007).
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (granting 
motions to dismiss stockholder claims that options grants constituted actionable waste); Zupnick v. 
Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384 (Del. 1997) (same); In re 3COM Corp. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 
WL 1009210, at *4, *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) (same).
102. 964 A.2d 106, 137 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. 914 A.2d 674, 650 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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value of at least $5.60.104 The directors then authorized the company to borrow 
approximately $700,000 to cover the taxes owed by the inside directors on the shares 
they received, the sum of which constituted 8.4% of the company’s annual net 
proceeds.105 The court held that a tax-free grant of nearly a third of the company’s 
voting power and dividend stream to existing managers in exchange for one-tenth of 
a penny per share raised a pleading-stage inference of waste.106
 Similarly, in Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, the Delaware Chancery Court held that 
the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim of waste when the corporation awarded its 
chairman the right to acquire 10% of the fully diluted equity of a valuable, wholly 
owned subsidiary of the corporation and required the corporation to finance the 
chairman’s exercise of that option on a non-recourse basis.107 The chairman was given 
an option to purchase the subsidiary’s stock at $1.86 per share, while these same shares 
were worth eleven dollars merely two years later when the subsidiary went public.108
  2. Challenging Director Compensation for Failure to Disclose Material Information
 Another way for a stockholder-plaintiff to eliminate the protection of the business 
judgment rule given to a ratified director decision is to successfully allege that the 
proxy statement109 soliciting stockholder approval of the compensation plan was 
misleading or omitted material information.110 These allegations, if proven, render 
ratification ineffective and shift the burden to the directors to disprove a breach of the 
duty of disclosure.111 To access the ratification safe harbor, directors must meet “an 
affirmative ‘burden of demonstrating full and fair disclosure.’”112 The burden is met 
by showing that even after reviewing a complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, it does not contain facts supporting an inference that the directors failed to 
disclose a material fact or otherwise mislead stockholders.113
104. Id. at 650–51.
105. Id. at 651.
106. Id. at 652–53.
107. 792 A.2d 964, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 2001).
108. Id. at 969–70.
109. A proxy statement is a document that shareholders are entitled to receive prior to a shareholder meeting of 
a company whose securities are registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This 
document must contain all the important facts about issues on which shareholders are asked to vote on, so 
that they can make informed decisions about matters that will be brought up at an annual stockholder 
meeting. See Proxy Statement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/answers/proxy.htm (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2014).
110. See, e.g., Noerr v. Greenwood, No. C.A. 14320, 1997 WL 419633, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 16, 1997) (noting that 
the burden to prove the entire fairness of certain compensation plans shifted to defendants upon plaintiff ’s 
showing of inadequate disclosures in the proxy statements seeking shareholders’ approval of said plans).
111. See id. at *3.
112. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 665 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Co., 700 A.2d 135, 140–41 (Del. 1997)).
113. Id.
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 The fiduciary duty of disclosure, used interchangeably with the “duty of complete 
candor,”114 requires directors to disclose all material information within their control 
when they seek shareholder action.115 By ensuring adequate disclosure, the fiduciary 
duty of complete candor prohibits “misleading partial disclosures”116 and, in some cases, 
“literally true statements” if materially incomplete.117 For the most part, Delaware 
courts have followed the federal definition of materiality, holding the two standards 
comparable.118 Thus, as under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5,119 
information is material under Delaware law if there is a “substantial likelihood that, 
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance 
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.”120 Furthermore, “there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed 
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
made available.”121 Delaware courts have noted that materiality is a mixed question of 
law, because it involves information mandated by statute and facts,122 and it should be 
answered from the perspective of stockholders, not directors.123
 However, Delaware courts do not require disclosure of all relevant information. To 
determine what qualifies as adequate disclosure, courts balance the benefits of disclosure 
against the harms of inundating stockholders with unnecessary information.124 This 
materiality test ensures that disclosures are not so broad as to bury “shareholders in an 
avalanche of trivial information” or otherwise cause investor confusion.125 “The theory 
goes that there is a risk of information overload such that shareholders’ interests are best 
served by an economy of words rather than an overflow of adjectives and adverbs in 
solicitation statements.”126
114. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 
49 Vand. L. Rev. 1087, 1097–98 (1996).
115. Id. at 1090–91 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)).
116. See Weiss v. Samsonite Corp., 741 A.2d 366, 374 n.19 (Del. Ch. 1999).
117. See Sonet v. Plum Creek Timber Co., No. 16931, 1999 WL 160174, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 1999).
118. See Brown, Jr., supra note 77, at 669.
119. Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of false or misleading statements or omissions that result in fraud or deceit 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
120. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
121. Id.
122. Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 779 (Del. 1993).
123. Id. (“[T]he focus is on what a reasonable investor would consider important in tendering his stock, not 
what a director considers important.”).
124. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280–81 (Del. 1994); see also Solomon v. 
Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1128 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“The determination of the materiality of an alleged 
omission or misstatement ‘requires a careful balancing of the potential benefits of disclosure against the 
resultant harm.’” (quoting Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1279)).
125. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
126. Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1128.
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 In the specific context of compensation plan ratification, Delaware courts hold 
that the duty of disclosure is satisfied by disclosing a “fair summary of all of the 
relevant terms and conditions of the proposed plan of compensation, together with 
any material extrinsic fact within the board’s knowledge bearing on the issue.”127 
Delaware court decisions also offer guidance on which nondisclosures will disqualify 
the ratification of a compensation plan.
 In Sample, stockholders brought a derivative waste claim arising out of purportedly 
unlawful enrichment of the board members by alleging, inter alia, that stockholder 
ratification of the company’s stock incentive plan was procured through materially 
misleading disclosures.128 The Delaware Chancery Court articulated the rule for 
sustaining a complaint for a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure within the 
context of director compensation.129 The court held that to survive a motion to 
dismiss, a complaint must plead that a material fact relevant to the voting decision 
had not been disclosed, or that the directors had failed to provide a full and fair 
explanation of the rationale for the proposal.130 Under Sample, information regarding 
a compensation plan is “material” if a reasonable investor would consider it relevant 
in making his decision on whether to cast his vote for or against the plan.131 There, 
the following omitted facts were held to be material: (1) all of the shares authorized 
by the stockholders would be granted to the “insider majority,” and (2) the shares 
authorized by the incentive plan would be the only shares the company could issue in 
the upcoming five years.132 Furthermore, the court opined that the omission of the 
true rationale for the plan—issuing 200,000 shares to the insider majority instead of 
attracting and retaining key employees—was detrimental to the stockholder 
ratification, rendering it ineffective.133 The Sample court concluded that because 
stockholder approval was obtained through materially defective disclosures, the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied.
 In In re Tyson Foods Inc. Consolidated Shareholder Litigation, another stockholder 
derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duties within the context of director 
compensation, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the validity of stockholder 
ratification required the “full, unvarnished truth” in a proxy statement seeking 
stockholder approval of a plan authorizing stock grants to the company’s directors.134 
The court further held that when a plan authorizes “spring-loading” or “bullet-
127. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997).
128. 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007).
129. Id. at 665.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 664 n.55.
132. Id. at 666.
133. Id. at 666–67.
134. No. C.A. 1106-CC, 2007 WL 2351071, at *4 n.18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007).
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dodging,”135 this information should be expressly disclosed in the proxy.136 Because the 
proxy lacked explicit statements that the plan authorized directors to make these 
challenged, “improbably fortuitous” stock awards, it rendered the stockholder ratification 
ineffective and thus eliminated the protection of the business judgment rule.137
 Notably in Tyson, in addition to clarifying what constitutes a disclosure of 
“material information,” the court narrowed the application of the business judgment 
rule by carving out an exception in cases where “spring-loading” or “bullet-dodging” 
is alleged.138 The Tyson court held that a claim against a plan authorizing “spring-
loading” or “bullet-dodging” will rebut the business judgment rule if a plaintiff can 
establish that: (1) the challenged grants were given pursuant to an options plan, (2) 
the directors who approved the grants possessed material non-public information 
soon to be released that would affect the company’s share price, and (3) those 
directors issued the options with the intent to circumvent otherwise valid stockholder-
approved restrictions upon the exercise price of the options.139
 Even though the Tyson court narrowed the safe harbor of the business judgment 
rule, its holding is limited to the very specific circumstances of “spring-loading” or 
“bullet-dodging.” Outside these unique circumstances, a dissatisfied stockholder is 
still limited to claims of waste or defective disclosures when challenging excessive 
compensation awards made to the company’s board post ratification. Only upon 
having successfully alleged either waste or invalid ratification would the burden shift 
to the defendants to prove the entire fairness of the compensation award. This was 
the state of affairs before Seinfeld v. Slager.
iV. sLagEr and its rEstriCtiOn Of thE bUsinEss JUdgMEnt safE harbOr
 As in Tyson, in Sample’s dicta, the Delaware Chancery Court opined that the 
protection granted to ratified director actions should be further limited in the context 
of director compensation.140 The court noted that ratification is not a “blank check” 
theory, and therefore properly ratified corporate actions can still be challenged if 
directors breach a fiduciary duty.141 In this context, balancing law and equity is “an 
135. “Spring-loading” is defined as granting options just before the quarterly earnings release; “bullet-
dodging” is defined as delaying granting options until after the release of quarterly earnings containing 
materially adverse information. Both “spring-loading” and “bullet-dodging” increase the value of the 
option grants, causing the company to receive too little money when the options are eventually exercised. 
See Justin Fox, Which Options Sins Are Committed Most?, Time (Nov. 14, 2006), http://business.time.
com/2006/11/14/which_options_sins_are_committ/#ixzz2EKRzbdt3.
136. See In re Tyson Foods, 2007 WL 2351071.
137. Id. at *4; see also Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 446–47 (Del. Ch. 2008) (providing similar 
reasoning).
138. In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007).
139. Id.
140. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 2007).
141. Id. at 663–64.
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essential aspect” of American corporate law.142 As a result, “[s]tockholders can entrust 
directors with broad legal authority precisely because they know that that authority 
must be exercised consistently with equitable principles of fiduciary duty.”143 But, the 
court did not apply these equitable principles in Sample; instead, the court discredited 
ratification due to inadequate disclosures and on this ground denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss. However, these equitable principles were fully developed in Slager, 
giving rise to a new standard for reviewing director compensation decisions following 
proper ratification.
 In Slager, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Republic Services, Inc., claimed, inter alia, 
that directors breached their duty of loyalty and wasted corporate assets by awarding 
themselves certain stock options.144 The plaintiff asserted that the board had overpaid 
its members by awarding them too many time-vested, restricted stock units in 2009 
and 2010.145 Under Republic’s Stock Incentive Plan, which had been approved by the 
company’s stockholders, the directors were authorized to award a total of 10.5 million 
shares, 2.5 million of which were subject to grants of options or stock appreciation 
rights, to any “eligible individual” during any fiscal year, and 1.25 million of which 
were subject to grants of performance shares, restricted stock, and awards of common 
stock to any “eligible individual” during any fiscal year.146 Furthermore, the plan gave 
the directors “sole and absolute discretion” to grant restricted stock units in those 
amounts and on those terms as they deemed appropriate.147
 In 2009, the director-defendants awarded themselves, as “eligible” participants in 
the plan, $743,700 per member in restricted stock units. As a result, the directors’ 
annual individual compensation ranged from $843,000 to $891,000.148 In 2010, the 
board awarded each director $215,000 in restricted stock units, such that the 
directors’ individual annual compensation ranged from $320,000 to $345,000.149 
The plaintiff alleged that the directors’ compensation far exceeded the compensation 
paid by Republic’s peers to their board members and thereby constituted corporate 
waste.150 Relying on Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny,151 where the court held that an 
extraordinarily unusual equity award satisfied the waste standard, the plaintiff 
142. Id. at 664.
143. Id. 
144. Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
145. Id. at *11.
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *11.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 792 A.2d 964, 976 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2001).
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argued that the stocks awarded to Republic’s directors were “unusual” and thus, 
under Delaware law, should qualify as waste.152
 The Slager court held that there are limits on the applicability of the doctrine of 
ratification.153 Consequently, the court refused to give any consideration to the 
ratification of Republic’s Stock Incentive Plan in deciding whether the directors’ 
actions should be subject to the business judgment rule or the entire fairness 
standard.154 Instead, the fact that the plan lacked “sufficient definition” was held to 
be the reason why directors were not protected by the safe harbor of the business 
judgment rule.155 The court enunciated a new rule: “Though the stockholders 
approved this plan, there must be some meaningful limit imposed by the stockholders 
on the Board for the plan to . . . receive the blessing of the business judgment 
rule[.]”156 Echoing the reasoning in Sample, the Slager court stated that a stockholder-
approved carte blanche to the directors is not enough—“[t]he sufficiency of definition 
that anoints a stockholder-approved option or bonus plan with business judgment 
rule protection exists on a continuum.”157 The court further clarified that “[t]he more 
definite a plan, the more likely that a board’s compensation decision will be labeled 
disinterested and qualify for protection under the business judgment rule.”158 If a 
board has absolute discretion, even if granted by a stockholder-approved plan, with 
little guidance as to the amounts or terms of the awards, the board will likely have 
the burden to show that the transaction is entirely fair.159
 The Slager court concluded that Republic’s Stock Incentive Plan had no effective 
limits because it authorized each director to grant and to receive an annual award of 
up to 1.25 million shares, which could amount to $21,691,250 per director per year, 
using the 2009 restricted stock value of $24.79 per share.160 Accordingly, the directors 
were interested in awarding themselves substantial bonuses and thus had the burden 
to prove that the amounts they awarded to themselves were entirely fair.161
152. See Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 40, Slager, 2012 WL 2501105 (No. 6462-
VCG). 
153. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105, at *12.
154. Id.
155. Id.




160. Id. at *11.
161. Id. at *12.
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 A.  Interpreting Slager’s Standard for Reviewing Director Decisions Regarding Their 
Own Compensation
 Slager created a new legal standard for reviewing director decisions regarding 
their own compensation subject to Delaware law.162 This new standard has created 
uncertainty about which principles corporate directors should follow in proposing 
compensation plans and in making compensation awards to themselves under a 
previously ratified compensation plan to receive protection of the business judgment 
rule. This note suggests that under the Slager standard, corporations and their board 
members might avoid liability if they adhere to the following guidelines: (1) director 
awards must be consistent with the explicit terms of a stockholder-approved 
compensation plan, (2) the compensation plan presented to the stockholders for 
approval must have “sufficiently defined terms” and (3) the plan must impose 
“meaningful limits” on each specific permissible award.
 First, to qualify for business judgment deference, director equity awards should 
be consistent with the expectations of the stockholders who approved the 
compensation plan.163 In other words, directors cannot exceed the authority granted 
to them by ratification and must strictly follow the plan’s express provisions.164 To 
illustrate, in Weiss v. Swanson, the court disallowed “spring-loading” and “bullet-
dodging” stock option awards made to the company’s directors where a specific 
provision in the plan authorizing such practices did not exist.165 Similarly, in Ryan v. 
Gifford, in deciding whether to allow a derivative action, the court concluded that 
the practice of backdating166 director stock options likely violated the express 
provision of the stockholder-approved incentive plan.167 Following this logic, in 
Criden v. Steinberg, a case challenging stock options granted to corporate directors, 
the court authorized the board to reprice stock options where the stockholder-
approved plan explicitly authorized repricing to incentivize performance or to 
encourage retention of key employees and non-employee directors.168
162. See Arthur H. Kohn, Delaware Case Raises Question About Structuring Director Compensation, Harv. L. 
Sch. F. Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Aug. 30, 2012, 9:14 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2012/08/30/delaware-case-raises-question-about-structuring-director-compensation/ 
(discussing Slager’s new standard); Edward M. McNally, When May Directors Vote Themselves Bonuses?, 
Del. Bus. Litig. Rep. (July 18, 2012), http://www.delawarebusinesslitigation.com/2012/07/articles/
when-may-directors-vote-themselves-bonuses/. 
163. See Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
164. Ryan ex rel. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 354 (Del. Ch. 2007).
165. Swanson, 948 A.2d at 443–44.
166. “Backdating” refers to the practice of a company issuing stock options to an executive on a certain date, 
while providing fraudulent documentation asserting that the options were actually issued earlier. See 
Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, Wall St. J. (Mar. 18, 2006, 11:59 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB114265075068802118.html.
167. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354–56.
168. No. 17082, 2000 WL 354390, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2000).
761
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
 Second, to ensure protection of the business judgment rule, directors should 
make equity awards pursuant to a stockholder-approved compensation plan that has 
“sufficiently defined terms.”169 Satisfying this element is difficult because there is 
limited case law interpreting this concept. The notion of having “sufficiently defined 
terms” in a compensation plan was first introduced in In re 3COM Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation.170 There, 3COM stockholders approved a compensation plan that included 
caps on the number of shares that could be granted for each type of board service per 
year.171 Specifically, the plan allowed payment of 60,000 shares to the board 
members, 80,000 to the chairman, and 24,000 to committee members.172 In 
compliance with the terms of the plan, the board awarded each director between 
22,500 and 45,000 shares having an approximate value of $650,000 per director.173 
The court afforded the defendants the protection of the business judgment rule and 
treated the awards as proper because “directors [did not] independently or unilaterally 
[grant] themselves stock options,” instead, the stock options accrued under the terms 
of an established compensation plan with “sufficiently defined terms.”174
 The court in Slager distinguished Republic’s plan from 3COM’s to illustrate a 
lack of “sufficiency of definition,” and emphasized that Republic’s plan had no 
“bounds” because the plan provided directors with virtually unlimited discretion in 
determining their compensation.175 Theoretically, Republic’s board could have 
awarded each director an amount of stock units worth up to $21,691,250 annually, 
while the median compensation paid to a director at a corporation of Republic’s size 
was $178,000.176 Under Slager, the presence of a sufficient definition correlates with 
the level of discretion afforded to board members by the explicit terms of the stock 
plan. The more restrictions the plan imposes on director discretion, the more 
“sufficiently defined” a court will likely hold the terms to be. To comply with Slager’s 
new standard and to ensure that equity awards made to the company’s directors were 
protected by the business judgment rule, the parties in Slager’s action stipulated to 
modify the terms of the plan to reduce the number of stock units that can be awarded 
to a non-employee director of Republic from 2.5 million to 15,000.177
 Third, Slager seems to suggest that providing “meaningful limits” serves as a 
restriction on the board’s discretion and ensures that the plan has “sufficiently 
169. Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
170. No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999).
171. Id. at *3 n.9.
172. 3COM Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Form 14A), at 16 (Aug. 20, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/738076/ 
0000950005-98-000719.txt.
173. In re 3COM Corp., 1999 WL 1009210, at *1 n.3, *4.
174. Id. at *3.
175. Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
176. See supra Part II.B. 
177. See April 1, 2013 Letter to the Hon. Sam Glasscock, III, Slager, 2012 WL 2501105 (No. 6462-VCG).
762
Seinfeld v. Slager: The delaware ChanCery CourT’S new legal STandard NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
defined terms.” The next logical step in decoding Slager’s standard is to identify the 
provisions of a compensation plan where these “limits” should be imposed. Analyzing 
Slager in conjunction with 3COM allows us to infer what specific “limits” articulated 
in an equity compensation plan would satisfy Slager. At a minimum, a plan must 
explicitly define the total number of shares authorized for issuance and the maximum 
number of shares that the plan can award to any eligible individual per year. Both 
Republic’s and 3COM’s plans satisfied this requirement. In Slager, the plan provided 
the total number of shares and the individual annual awards authorized. The total 
number of shares of common stock that could be issued under the plan was set at 
10.5 million shares, 2.5 million was the maximum number of shares that could be 
awarded to any one eligible individual during fiscal year, and individual awards could 
not exceed $4 million.178 Similarly in 3COM, the company’s director stock option 
plan set caps on the total number of shares available for grants under the plan—
approximately 1.68 million179—and on the number of shares awarded to any eligible 
participant in a fiscal year in accordance with the type of board service.180
 By further comparing Slager and 3COM, it appears that tying director equity 
compensation to that of the company’s peers181 imposes a “meaningful limit”182 and may 
establish a “sufficient definition” of a stock plan’s terms. It is insufficient for a stock plan 
to merely articulate maximums on total and individual awards; these maximums must 
be “meaningful”—that is, based on some specific guidelines or criteria.183 In Slager, 
where the court disallowed director awards without proving their entire fairness, the 
directors’ annual compensation far exceeded the compensation of directors from any one 
of the company’s peers.184 In contrast, the plaintiff in 3COM made no reference to 
compensation awarded to directors from the company’s peer group. The only factual 
allegation in this regard was that the options had a value that was “quite large (at least 
$650,000 per director),” which could mean that the award at issue was comparable to 
178. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105, at *10; see also Republic Servs., Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 14A) (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1060391/000095014407003261/g06437def14a.htm.
179. Under an amendment to the original Director Stock Option Plan, on July 22, 1988 the board of directors 
approved an amendment reserving an additional one million shares of common stock. Added to this number 
were the original 167,000 shares under the original Director Stock Option Plan. 3COM Corp., Definitive 
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 14A), at 15 (Aug. 
20, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/738076/0000950005-98-000719.txt.
180. Id. at 17 (limiting eligible participants to directors who are not employees of the company).
181. “Peer group” usually refers to companies that operate in the same industry sector and are of similar size. 
See Peer Group, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/peer-group.asp (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 
182. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Stockholder Challenges to 
Executive Compensation (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?Trac
kedFile=4B46116602DDECD896B179&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281AED996A07D5F9F9478A
B5A90188899.
183. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105, at *12.
184. Id. at *11.
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the compensation paid by 3COM’s peers, or even that the plan disallowed awards in 
excess of those paid by their peers.185 Therefore, it can be inferred that if a plan limits 
permissible awards by comparing them to those of the company’s peers, the plan may 
significantly limit the directors’ discretion and will more likely qualify as having 
“sufficiently defined terms.” Thus, hypothetically, including a provision such as “the 
maximum number of shares that may be subject to award for director service shall be at 
the fiftieth percentile of the total equity awards paid to similarly situated directors of the 
companies in the peer group,” where a peer group is identified by an independent 
compensation consultant, could guarantee the protection of the business judgment rule 
for directors who set their own stock awards in accordance with said plan.
 Another guideline for satisfying the “meaningful limits” requirement can be 
extrapolated from the fact that the plan in 3COM set ceilings on awards based on 
specific categories of service, such as lead director, member of a committee, or chair of 
the board. In contrast, in Slager, the plan did not incorporate these categorical ceilings. 
Consequently, if a plan correlates a permissible award to the time and energy required 
of directors, or at least to the categories of their board service, this would provide 
another restriction on director discretion. Accordingly, such a plan is more likely to 
satisfy Slager’s “meaningful limits” requirement.
 It is important to note that “[t]he sufficiency of definition that anoints a stockholder-
approved option or bonus plan with business judgment rule protection exists on a 
continuum.”186 To date, Delaware case law has given us only two reference points on 
this continuum: 3COM and Slager. A plan similar to the one at issue in 3COM (that 
includes the maximum number of shares authorized to be granted in aggregate, per 
year, per person, and sets ceilings on awards based on specific categories of service, 
such as lead director, member of a committee, or the chair of the board) will fall within 
the safe zone on the continuum. Alternatively, a plan with terms similar to the one at 
issue in Slager (that gives discretion to pay out annually to each director over one 
hundred times more than the average compensation paid to a director of a similarly 
situated company, allows unlimited director discretion, has no “meaningful maximums” 
or restrictions based on categories of director services) will likely raise some red flags.
 Reviewing a few proxy statements recently filed with the SEC provides additional 
understanding of Slager’s “continuum.” For example, an equity compensation plan 
presented for shareholder approval by Air Methods Corporation, which contained a 
provision giving board members the discretion to award all 1.8 million shares available 
for issuance under the plan to any single participant (including a board member) in any 
calendar year,187 is unlikely to satisfy Slager’s standard because it lacks “sufficiency of 
definition.” Thus, Air Methods Corporation’s directors will have the burden to prove 
that the awards made under the plan are entirely fair if these awards were to be 
185. In re 3COM Corp. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 16721, 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999).
186. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105, at *12.
187. Air Methods Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Form 14A) (Nov. 31, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/816159/000114036112 
048365/formdefa14a.htm.
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challenged by the company’s shareholders. Alternatively, a director compensation plan 
approved by shareholders of pSivida Corporation, which sets an annual ceiling of 
30,000 shares for each board member and 45,000 shares for the chairman, on the 
ground that these awards are consistent with the median equity compensation paid by 
the company’s peers, will most likely be put in close proximity to 3COM’s plan on the 
continuum because it has “sufficiency of definition” and should therefore fall within 
the purview of the business judgment rule.188
 B. Protecting Directors from Liability Under Slager
 Undoubtedly, Slager created a more stringent standard for reviewing director 
compensation awards. In light of the limited guidance from Delaware courts on the 
interpretation of Slager’s “meaningful limits,” directors may need to find additional 
methods of protecting themselves from liability beyond ensuring that their company’s 
compensation plan contains sufficiently defined terms and meaningful limits on 
directors’ discretion in determining compensation. This note suggests that complying 
with certain principles of procedural prudence might provide directors with this 
additional protection.
 To achieve additional protection, directors can shift the authority to determine 
director compensation from the directors to the stockholders. Instead of merely 
seeking shareholder approval of the general terms of an equity compensation plan, 
corporations can opt to solicit shareholder votes on stock awards made each year to 
their board members—“say-on-pay” on directors’ annual equity compensation.
 Pursuant to the NASDAQ and New York Stock Exchange rules adopted and 
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003, all publicly traded 
companies were required to obtain stockholder approval for almost all equity-based 
compensation plans, material revisions to plans (including repricing), and individual 
non-plan grants.189 However, these rules did not require companies to submit individual 
annual equity awards to stockholders for approval.190 In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 by adding section 14A,191 commonly referred to as “say-on-pay,” which requires 
companies to submit their executive compensation, including equity awards, to non-
binding stockholder votes at least once every three years. However, the Act does not 
extend this requirement to director compensation. Even though it is not required, 
companies could give stockholders input on their directors’ equity awards. In accordance 
with the doctrine of ratification described in Part III.B, “say-on-pay” approval of 
specific annual equity awards to corporate directors, if validly obtained, would serve as 
188. pSivida Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 
14A) (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1314102/000119312512435039/
d411814ddef14a.htm.
189. Press Release, SEC, New Rules Require Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation (June 30, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-78.htm. 
190. Id.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012).
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a defense to a claim of a breach of fiduciary duty and would preclude judicial scrutiny 
of the award even if it is made under a plan lacking “sufficiently defined terms.”192
 But some theorists argue that stockholders are not well suited to set executive 
and director compensation primarily because the complexity of compensation 
schemes and the cost of understanding them requires ability beyond that of an 
average stockholder.193 Therefore, these ordinary business decisions should be made 
by the company’s management and not its stockholders.194 Additionally, the cost of 
subjecting director equity awards to annual stockholder votes could be unreasonably 
high for both corporations and investors.195 Furthermore, similar to cases involving 
“say-on-pay” votes—where a number of companies faced derivative litigation alleging 
that the boards breached their fiduciary duties by adopting proposed executive 
compensation plans despite a negative “say-on-pay” by stockholders196—the 
stockholders’ negative votes on director compensation can lead to adverse litigation.
 Another way of limiting director liability where awards are made pursuant to a plan 
lacking “sufficient definition” and “meaningful limits” is to have an independent advisor 
design the proposed equity compensation package. In accordance with section 141(e) of 
the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, directors “shall . . . be fully 
protected” from liability if they reasonably and in good faith rely on expert advice, but 
nevertheless produce a transaction that is unfair to the corporation or its stockholders, as 
long as the unfair aspect of the transaction arose from the expert’s advice.197 Delaware 
courts have limited the application of this statute to disinterested directors in duty of 
care cases, thereby excluding conflicted transactions despite the plain language of the 
statute that does not impose such limitations.198 Nevertheless, Delaware courts will 
consider reasonable reliance on expert counsel as a pertinent factor when evaluating 
whether corporate directors met the standard of fairness in self-interested transactions.199 
192. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[I]nformed, uncoerced, disinterested 
shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate directors have a material conflict of interest 
has the effect of protecting the transaction from judicial review except on the basis of waste.”).
193. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation—A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 937, 
955–56 (1993).
194. Roshan Sonthalia, Shareholder Voting on All Stock Option Plans: An Unnecessary and Unwise Proposition, 
51 UCLA L. Rev. 1203, 1219 (2004).
195. See Elaine Buckberg & Jonathan Macey, Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on 
Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation (2009), available at http://www.nera.com/
upload/Buckberg_Macey_Report_FINAL.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Dennis v. Hart, No. 11cv2271, 2012 WL 33199, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2012) (dismissing a 
stockholder-plaintiff ’s claim that the adverse advisory stockholder vote on the company’s executive 
compensation rebutted the business judgment surrounding the board’s decisions to increase executive 
compensation in 2010).
197. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(e) (West 2013).
198. See, e.g., Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 751 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that a section 
141(e) defense is not available for conf licted directors who relied on the advice of a compensation 
consulting firm).
199. Id.; see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch. 1994).
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Hence, even though retaining a compensation advisor might not help directors win a 
motion to dismiss under Slager or under Delaware courts’ interpretation of section 
141(e), it may strengthen their argument that the transaction was entirely fair in the later 
stages of litigation.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 In the past few decades, Delaware courts have begun limiting the application of 
the business judgment rule by carefully scrutinizing director decisions and, as a result, 
their recent opinions have allowed more cases to survive pretrial motions asserting the 
business judgment rule defense.200 Until recently, Delaware courts primarily relied on 
their prior broad interpretations of fiduciary duties and their notions of best practices in 
denying these pretrial motions.201 However, in Slager, the Delaware Chancery Court 
heightened the standard of judicial review by requiring directors to show that decisions 
regarding their own compensation were either made under a stockholder-approved 
compensation plan with stringent restrictions on the directors’ discretion, or were 
entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.202 As a result, courts now have an 
additional precedent to consider in determining whether to dismiss a shareholder 
action challenging director compensation.
 Presently, stock plans rarely include “sufficiently defined terms” or provide 
“meaningful limits”; they generally give board members unbridled authority to make 
decisions regarding their compensation. Thus, they are vulnerable to potential abuse 
by the board members entrusted with this authority. On the one hand, Slager creates 
an important accountability vehicle that should lead to additional care in director 
compensation decisions. On the other hand, it exposes directors to an increased risk 
of derivative lawsuits. This note’s guidelines on interpreting Slager’s standard should 
assist directors in mitigating this risk. This note has suggested one way to interpret 
Slager and has proposed avenues that corporate directors can pursue to shield 
themselves from liability under Slager’s standard. Only time will tell how Delaware 
courts will apply and further enforce the standard Slager has introduced.
200. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000) (dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint challenging 
directors’ decisions regarding the compensation paid to the company’s former president, but giving the 
plaintiffs leave to replead); In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by finding that the complaint stated a claim for 
self-dealing transactions); Ryan ex rel. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 358 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and stating that the stockholder’s 
allegations of breach of fiduciary duty were sufficient to rebut the business judgment rule); Sample v. 
Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 669 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and 
finding the allegation of waste sufficient to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule); 
In re Primedia Inc. Derivative Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. Ch. 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim because the court could reasonably infer self-dealing in breach of the duty of 
loyalty); Orloff v. Shulman, No. 852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005) 
(denying a motion to dismiss in part by finding that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to 
conduct discovery on their claims of waste and breaches of fiduciary duty).
201. See cases cited supra note 200.
202. No. 6462-VCG, 2012 WL 2501105 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
